

(b)(3)

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Monday, July 19, 2004 7:37 AM (b)(3)
To: [REDACTED]
Cc: [REDACTED]
Subject: RE: RFI from ADM Church re Interrogator Issues

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~CAVEATS: ~~NOFORN~~

TERMS: NONE

I don't know about the Army fighting for an expanded role, at least in Afghanistan, but I do know that CENTCOM never requested additional [REDACTED] Strategic interrogation and debriefing was, and still is, generally conducted at GTMO. [REDACTED] (b)(1)

[REDACTED] Had CENTCOM requested more [REDACTED] we certainly would have provided them. I know of no RFF that was denied from CENTCOM. I can't speak for OIF.

[REDACTED] (b)(1)

I recommend that future doctrine establish the JIDC as an umbrella interrogation/debriefing HQ which have separate Joint Interrogation Facilities [REDACTED] and Joint Debriefing Facilities [REDACTED] subordinate to it. [REDACTED]

Comments appreciated.

(b)(3)

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED] (b)(3)
Sent: Friday, July 16, 2004 5:15 PM
To: [REDACTED]
Cc: [REDACTED]
Subject: FW: RFI from ADM Church re Interrogator Issues

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

7/19/2004

CAVEATS: ~~NOFORN~~

TERMS: NONE

(b)(3)

(b)(1)

- I find the atch'd really interesting -

and that they fought for as large a piece of the pie as possible?

- The admiral is correct in stating the original intent in the consolidation of DoD HUMINT was that would be responsible for interrogation at major EPW detention areas.

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

- In any event, do any of you have any comments/observations you'd like to contribute to help us develop a response to the attached memo?

(b)(3)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(3)
Sent: Friday, July 16, 2004 4:11 PM
To: (b)(3)
Subject: FW: RFI from ADM Church re Interrogator Issues

(b)(3)

From: (b)(3)
Sent: Friday, July 16, 2004 4:11:25 PM

Subject: RE: RFI from ADM Church re Interrogator Issues
Auto forwarded by a Rule

7/19/2004

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

CAVEATS: ~~NONE~~

TERMS: NONE

ALCON:

(b)(3)

At 0900 hours on 19 Jul, we will meet in [REDACTED] office to discuss the issues in the attached RFI and sort out responsibilities for the input. Suspense has been moved to COB 23 Jul. [REDACTED] would like a draft by SOB Thursday, 22 Jul.
Thanks

[REDACTED]
(b)(3)

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: July 16, 2004 15:52

To: [REDACTED] (b)(3)
Cc: [REDACTED]

Subject: RE: RFI from ADM Church re Interrogator Issues

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

CAVEATS: ~~NOFORN~~

TERMS: NONE

Gentlemen:

Attached is the subject memo for your viewing pleasure. [REDACTED] just spoke with [REDACTED] (b)(6)
and said the due date is pretty tight for the info being requested, so we now have until next Fri (b)(3)
to turn our response in.

[REDACTED]
(b)(3)

-----Original Message-----

7/19/2004

(b)(3)

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Friday, July 16, 2004 3:33 PM
To: [REDACTED]
Cc: [REDACTED]
Subject: RE: RFI from ADM Church re Interrogator Issues

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

CAVEATS: ~~NOFORN~~

TERMS: NONE

[REDACTED]

(b)(3)

[REDACTED] is working a similar action for the DIA IG. Suspect the questions are similar.

[REDACTED]

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED] (b)(3)
Sent: Friday, July 16, 2004 3:29 PM
To: [REDACTED]
Cc: [REDACTED]
Subject: RFI from ADM Church re Interrogator Issues
Importance: High

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

CAVEATS: ~~NOFORN~~

TERMS: NONE

Gentlemen:

[REDACTED] received a faxed memo today from ADM Church re an RFI/statement of record on DHS's role in OIF/OEF, mainly focusing on interrogator issues. Response is due **20 July** to the ADM. I have copies of the memo, so who is best to take lead on this so I can give them a copy to work off of? I will give you all a copy as well. Thanks.

(b)(3)

(b)(2)

V/R,

[REDACTED]

(b)(3)

7/19/2004

(b)(3)

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Friday, July 16, 2004 5:15 PM
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Cc: [REDACTED]

(b)(3)

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CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

CAVEATS: ~~NOFORN~~

TERMS: NONE

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7/19/2004

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CAVEATS: NONE

TERMS: NONE

ALCON:

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/ CAVEATS: ~~NOFORN~~

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7/19/2004

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(b)(3)
(b)(6)

[REDACTED]
(b)(3)

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]

Sent: Friday, July 16, 2004 3:33 PM

To: [REDACTED]

Cc: [REDACTED]

Subject: RE: RFI from ADM Church re Interrogator Issues

~~CLASSIFICATION: SECRET~~

~~CAVEATS: NOFORN~~

TERMS: NONE

[REDACTED]
(b)(3)

[REDACTED] is working a similar action for the DIA IG. Suspect the questions are similar. (b)(3)

[REDACTED]
(b)(3)

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To: [REDACTED]

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Subject: RFI from ADM Church re Interrogator Issues

Importance: High

~~CLASSIFICATION: SECRET~~

~~CAVEATS: NOFORN~~

TERMS: NONE

Gentlemen:

7/19/2004

██████████ received a faxed memo today from ADM Church re an RFI/statement of record on ██████████'s role in OIF/OEF, mainly focusing on interrogator issues. Response is due **20 July** to the ADM. I have copies of the memo, so who is best to take lead on this so I can give them a copy to work off of? I will give you all a copy as well. Thanks.

V/R,

(b)(3)

~~DERIVED FROM: DH SCG SEP 2003~~

~~DECLASSIFY ON: X1~~

~~CLASSIFICATION: SECRET~~

~~CAVEATS: NOFORN~~

~~TERMS: NONE~~

~~DERIVED FROM: DH SCG Feb 04~~

~~DECLASSIFY ON: X1~~

~~CLASSIFICATION: SECRET~~

~~CAVEATS: NOFORN~~

~~TERMS: NONE~~

~~DERIVED FROM: DIH SCG SEP 2003~~

~~DECLASSIFY ON: X1~~

~~CLASSIFICATION W/O ATCH: SECRET~~

~~CAVEATS W/O ATCH: NO FORN~~

~~TERMS W/OATCH: NONE~~

~~CLASSIFICATION: SECRET~~

7/19/2004

(b)(3)

[REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Thursday, July 01, 2004 11:07 AM
To: [REDACTED]
Cc: [REDACTED]
Subject: FW: [REDACTED] "RFI in Support of Detainee Task Force (DH)" S: 20-JUL-04 (b)(2)

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

CAVEATS: ~~FOUO~~

TERMS: NONE

Provided as we discussed. Thanks for assistance. [REDACTED] (b)(3)

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Tuesday, June 29, 2004 2:45 PM (b)(3)
To: [REDACTED]
Cc: [REDACTED]
Subject: [REDACTED] "RFI in Support of Detainee Task Force (DH)" S: 20-JUL-04 (b)(2)

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

CAVEATS: ~~FOUO~~

TERMS: NONE

THIS IS AN OFFICIAL EMAIL TASKER. [REDACTED] IS DELEGATED AS ACTION. THE DUE DATE IS 20 JULY. (b)(2)

ACTION: [REDACTED] (b)(2)

- Review initiator's guidance below
- Send your response to [REDACTED] by suspense date.

SUSPENSE DATE: 20-Jul-2004

REQUESTING COMPONENT: [REDACTED]
TASKING TYPE: NORMAL TASKING
PRIORITY: Priority (b)(3)

OVERALL GUIDANCE:

1. The IG point of contact is [REDACTED]

(b)(2)

7/9/2004

2. References:

a. Department of Defense Inspector General memorandum, 19 May 2004, subj: Reporting on the Status of Component Activities Review of Detainee/Prisoner Abuse

b. Secretary of Defense memorandum, 25 May 2004, subj: Detention Operations and Detainee Interrogation Techniques

c. Deputy Secretary of Defense memorandum, 23 June 2004, subj: Support to the DoD Detainee Task Force (DTF)

3. Recent allegations pertaining to alleged abuses of detainees and prisoners in Iraq have generated multiple, high level inquiries into the matter. At present the agency, through the IG, is coordinating responses to three such inquiries. The DoD IG requires, reference a., weekly reporting on all investigations or inquiries conducted by DoD components. The Secretary of Defense, reference b., chartered the Navy Inspector General to conduct a wide ranging review of DoD interrogation and debriefing policies, procedures, and activities. Additionally, the Deputy of Secretary of Defense, reference c., has requested documentation in support of the Detainee Task Force (DTF). These separate inquiries have stated their document search requirements and, while there are some redundancies in requests, it is in the interest of the agency not only to reply as promptly and thoroughly as possible, but also to maintain meticulous records of what has been submitted.

4. The most recent document search request, reference c., tasked all DoD elements to conduct a search of documents in support of the DoD Detainee Task Force (DTF) which is conducting a comprehensive review of allegations of abuse at DoD facilities from January 2000 to present.

5. The scope of the DTF search is:

"The search for documents should include all references to prisoners of war, detainees or civilian internees of the DoD, pursuant to the Global War on Terrorism or Operation Iraqi Freedom, whether located in: Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; the Naval Consolidated Brig, Charleston, South Carolina; Abu Ghraid, Camp Bucca, or other locations in Iraq; or in Afghanistan."

6. This tasking supplements the previous request for documents in support of the SECDEF initiated inquiry being conducted by the Navy Inspector General and applies to Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Directorates will provide material documenting DIA interaction with OEF/OIF organizations, including the Iraq Survey Group (ISG).

7. Do not contact ISG for documentation. ISG will respond to tasking from U.S. Central Command.

8. Documents identified in response to this tasker which were previously supplied in response to reference b. need not be submitted. However,

responding directorates will annotate on their responses, consistent with guidance in subparagraphs a. through c. below, that such documents exist and when they were submitted. Responding directorates will forward the following information along with each submission:

- a. An index identifying each document by date and author and including the document's classification level.
- b. The name, grade, duty location, and telephone number of the individual(s) who performed the search.
- c. An index of documents that are the subject of this request already disseminated outside the Department, including to whom, when, and why.

9. Specific Guidance: Search all files and collect all DIA directives, instructions, regulations, memoranda, requests for information and responses, letters, or other written materials applicable since 1 January 2000 that:

- a. Pertain to DIA interrogation policy, procedures, or "rules of engagement" with respect to prisoners of war, detainees, or civilian detainees of the Department or any of its components.

- b. Address the following:

- (1) Personnel detention policy, procedures, and organization.
- (2) Interrogation policy, procedures, and organization.
- (3) Relationship between detention and interrogation as they relate to force structure.
- (4) Training of regular and reserve personnel for these missions.
- (5) Use of contractors (e.g., interrogators, linguists, and interpreters) in connection with interrogation activities of missions of the DIA. Provide copies of contracts.

- c. Address DIA detention and interrogation as they relate to the Geneva Conventions and other applicable laws.

- d. Address DIA detention and interrogation policy, procedures or organization in relation to matters raised by the International Committee of the Red Cross.

- e. Show command relationships and operational practices that guided DoD detention and interrogation policies and procedures.

- f. Special access programs pertaining to DIA support for DoD/non-DoD interrogation and detention operations shall be identified by project name only with point of contact for access authorization.

10. Additional Guidance:

- a. DAJ2/DI: Identify all personnel assigned to DoD/non-DoD

7/9/2004

activities who participated in interrogations/debriefings in support of OEF/OIF operations. Provide name, grade, home assignment location, unit of attachment, dates of attachment, duty title, and, contact information.

b. DH: Provide a comprehensive list of all DIA documentation pertaining to interrogation and debriefing techniques that have been considered, authorized, used, and prohibited during OEF/OIF operations as noted below:

(1) For OEF/OIF, all specified material covering the period from initial DIA participation until present. For OIF only, required information is only until establishment of the ISG in June 2003.

(2) Letter of instructions issued by DIA personnel attached as supervisor in charge of the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Centers (JIDC) in support of OEF/OIF.

(3) Provide copies of all DH internal e-mails, memoranda, notes of meetings, etc., pertaining to the interrogation and debriefing of detainees/prisoners in Iraq or Afghanistan from January 2000 to date.

(4) Identify all personnel assigned to the DoD HUMINT augmentation teams or other tactical unit augmentations for OEF/OIF operations inception to date. Provide name, grade, home assignment location, unit of attachment, dates of attachment, duty title, and, contact information.

(5) Identify all personnel attached for HUMINT augmentation to non-DoD organizations for OEF/OIF operations from inception to date. Provide name, grade, home assignment location, unit of attachment, dates of attachment, duty title, and, contact information.

(6) Copies of all DIA generated SITREPs, operations reports, spot reports, and similar reports pertaining to interrogations and debriefing activities in which DIA personnel participated from inception to present.

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

CAVEATS: ~~FOUO~~

TERMS: NONE

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

CAVEATS: ~~FOUO~~

TERMS: NONE

7/9/2004

(b)(6)

From: [REDACTED]

Sent: Thursday, June 05, 2003 9:00 AM

(b)(3)

To: [REDACTED]

(b)(6)

Cc: [REDACTED]

(b)(1)(b)(2) Subject: [REDACTED]

~~CLASSIFICATION: SECRET~~CAVEATS: ~~NOFORN~~

TERMS: NONE

(b)(2)

~~(S//NF)~~ On 4 December 2002, the Dept. Army IG notified the ATSD(IO) that a [REDACTED] officer, while assigned to (b)(2) [REDACTED] as an interrogator may have violated federal statutes during the interrogation of a Bosnian national. Because the officer was assigned to [REDACTED] investigative jurisdiction was with [REDACTED]. On 27 May 2003, the [REDACTED] notified [REDACTED] that [REDACTED] had completed its investigation and had found no credible evidence that the [REDACTED] officer and others had violated law.

~~(S//NF)~~ However, the investigation did determine "...that at the time of the incident, there were no specific guidelines regarding interrogation techniques of detainee operations in Bosnia or elsewhere." Based on the [REDACTED] (b)(1) comment I recommend you review interrogation guidelines and procedures governing [REDACTED] activities worldwide and ensure that CIA personnel are familiar with statutory and regulatory provisions affecting such operations.

(b)(6)

~~DERIVED FROM DHS SOG, MAR 02~~~~DECLASSIFY ON: X1~~~~CLASSIFICATION: SECRET~~CAVEATS: ~~NOFORN~~

TERMS: NONE

7/30/2004

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

SUBJECT: Draft Concept for Utilization of Cooperating Source (U)

1. (U) Purpose: To request coordination /comment on subject

2. (U) Security: The unclassified nickname for this project is [REDACTED]

(b)(2)

(b)(6)

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

- Phase 2: Movement coordination and movement [REDACTED] / DOJ / JTF GTMO). The actual request for movement needed to come from DoD. (DOJ/USA suggested DoD to the USA who would forward to Main Justice.) (DIA/SOUTHCOM)

(b)(2)

- Phase 3: GTMO - Employ [REDACTED] IAW JTF GTMO assessment & utilization plan (JTF GTMO).

(b)(1), (b)(6)

- DoD would be required to clearly and specifically articulate how [REDACTED] would be used in GTMO. General statements will not be acceptable.

(b)(1),
(b)(6)

- Phase 4: Operational assessment, lessons learned (DIA/ [REDACTED] SOUTHCOM/JTFGTMO)

(b)(2)

(b)(1)

7. (S/NF) [REDACTED]: Assist assessment operations

* Videotapes provided by JTF GTMO

~~SECRET~~

From: [REDACTED]
 (b)(3) Sent: Tuesday, December 09, 2003 11:55 AM
 To: [REDACTED]
 Cc: [REDACTED]
 Subject: Interrogation Policy

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

CAVEATS: ~~NOFORN~~

TERMS: NONE

(b)(3) [REDACTED] - Please see below from [REDACTED]. In speaking with [REDACTED] just now, he recommends bringing [REDACTED] into the fray. He has the institutional knowledge and expertise to best convey our argument to GC.

(b)(3) [REDACTED] you are not missing anything. It is the lawyers who are missing the point. The [REDACTED] (b)(2)
 interrogation mission is codified under JCS and combatant command doctrine, and included in the [REDACTED]
 founding documents. In keeping with this mission, [REDACTED] has routinely identified and deployed
 interrogators to assist JTFs and Combatant Commanders with interrogations. With the increased
 (b)(1) demand for interrogators post-9/11, [REDACTED]
 (b)(2) [REDACTED]
 (b)(3) [REDACTED] Based
 on questionable conduct in the past by [REDACTED] interrogators, murky rules of the road, OSD interest in
 GTMO rules, significantly different [REDACTED] rules, and the central role [REDACTED] plays at GTMO, I directed a
 [REDACTED] interrogation policy be developed. I am pretty sure the DD was aware of this, [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED] attended several OSD legal meetings on interrogation policy. I believe the legal view that we
 simply belong to the Combatant Commanders and fall under their rules is shortsighted. [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED] It seems to me that these individuals need to be
 able to operate off of a fully coordinated and vetted interrogation policy. We have the experience and
 expertise to prepare such a document, and it definitely should be a joint document. If the lawyers want
 it to be a Joint Staff document, then I would argue the way to go is for DIA to coordinate and dispatch
 its policy, and then let the Joint Staff codify it in their doctrine, as we did with [REDACTED]. The
 Joint Staff does not have the expertise to prepare what you guys pulled together. I do not recall
 discussing this with [REDACTED] but I know he was aware of its development and of the meetings
 [REDACTED] Frankly, it never occurred to me that anyone except [REDACTED] DIA would
 prepare and issue such a policy. We issue policies on everything else we do—why not interrogation?

(b)(3) [REDACTED]

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]
 (b)(3) Sent: Tuesday, December 09, 2003 9:28 AM
 To: [REDACTED]
 Subject: FW: Interrogation Policy
 Sensitivity: Private

(b)(2)

HEADQUARTERS [REDACTED] INDEX.

1. PHONE LIST, [REDACTED] UNKNOWN AUTHOR, UNDATED, ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

2. PHONE LIST, [REDACTED] UNKNOWN AUTHOR, UNDATED,
~~CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN~~

3. EMAIL, LIST OF PERSONNEL INVOLVED IN CONSOLIDATED [REDACTED]

(b)(6)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(b)(2)

4. [REDACTED] LISTING OF
INTERROGATION PERSONNEL (JIDC), JUNE 2003, AUTHOR, [REDACTED]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

5. LIST OF DEPLOYED PERSONNEL - [REDACTED] DATED 15 JULY 2004, AUTHOR,
[REDACTED] ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

6. LIST OF DEPLOYED PERSONNEL - [REDACTED] DATED 16 JULY 2004, AUTHOR,
[REDACTED] ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

HEADQUARTERS [REDACTED] PERSONNEL INVOLVED IN TASKER SEARCH:

[REDACTED]

(b)(3)

[REDACTED] (b)(1)

(b)(2) 1. 29 OCT 02: [REDACTED] SUPPORT TO U.S. CENTRAL
COMAND OPLAN 1003 ~~(S//NF)~~

2. 15 NOV 02: AUTHORIZATION FOR [REDACTED] OFFICERS TO PARTICIPATE IN
CUSTODIAL INTERVIEWS ~~(S//NF)~~



(b)(1)
(b)(2)

12 JUL 04: [REDACTED] CONTACT [REDACTED] LIAISON CONTACT WITH [REDACTED]

(b)(1) (b)(2)

[REDACTED] ~~(C)~~



Defense Intelligence Agency
Office of the Inspector General
Office for Investigations
Report of Conversation

(b)(2)
(b)(3), (b)(6)

Date: 5 May 2004		Time: 1020
Name of Contact: [REDACTED]	Office/Division: [REDACTED]	Phone [REDACTED]
Address of Organization: [REDACTED]		
Employee Name: [REDACTED]	Office/Division: IG	Phone #: [REDACTED]
Circle One HE/I	CALLED/VISITED	
Subject: Concerns relating to IRAQ Prison Situation		

What was said:

Met with [REDACTED] who related that [REDACTED] related that [REDACTED] recently returned from a 6 month rotation in IRAQ. [REDACTED] related that [REDACTED] told [REDACTED] while in IRAQ [REDACTED] was in charge of the interrogations of the prisoners, and during this time [REDACTED] and the senior leadership knew of, or were aware of the incidents going on at the prison, as it has been described in the newspaper (Washington Post, dated 4 May 2004). [REDACTED] provided a copy of the newspaper. [REDACTED] went on to say that [REDACTED] related that there were two incidents involving the rape of two female detainees. [REDACTED] was asked if [REDACTED] witnessed or knew who committed the alleged rape. [REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] did not know who committed the rape and did not know witness the act. Additionally, [REDACTED] briefly related that the detainees were treated very roughly, as described in the newspaper. Once again, [REDACTED] did not provide specific details. [REDACTED] related that [REDACTED] was despondent over the fact that weapons of mass destruction (WMD) had not been found. [REDACTED] also could not say with any certainty if [REDACTED] had control over or the flow of information from the interrogators or if [REDACTED] was directly somehow in charge of the interrogators. [REDACTED] was asked if [REDACTED] while in IRAQ, was in a supervisory capacity or position to report or intervene with any regulatory violations, or human rights violations. [REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] did not state or indicate that [REDACTED] was in any type of supervisory position. However, [REDACTED] did related that while in IRAQ [REDACTED] worked at Camp Slayer, the prison was in another location, but [REDACTED] had the opportunity on more than one occasion to visit the prison. Once again [REDACTED] related that [REDACTED] related that [REDACTED] was assigned to handle the interrogations. [REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] is not accusing [REDACTED] of anything, [REDACTED] is not sure if [REDACTED] has been interviewed by [REDACTED] or any other agency. [REDACTED] ended the conversation by saying [REDACTED] did not want [REDACTED] released to [REDACTED] for providing the above listed information.

[REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] is currently on leave in [REDACTED] and upon his return will be transitioning to retire on or about the [REDACTED]

Reviewed by: *fcf* 5/6/04



Defense Intelligence Agency
Office of the Inspector General
Office for Investigations
Report of Conversation

Date: 15 June 2004

Project

Time: 0900

(b)(2)

Name of Contact: [REDACTED]

Office/Division: [REDACTED]

Phone

(b)(3) (b)(6)

Address of Organization: [REDACTED]

Employee Name: [REDACTED]

Office/Division: IG

Phone #: [REDACTED]

Circle One

1

CALLED/VISITED

Subject: IRAQ PRISON

What was said:

Met with [REDACTED] who related that [REDACTED] was deployed to IRAQ between [REDACTED] where [REDACTED] worked as a counter-terrorism analyst at the Inlet Fusion Center located on Camp Slayer. [REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] visited the Brigade Interrogation Facility (BIF) during the early part of Jan 04. The purpose of [REDACTED] visit was to assist in an interrogation of a detainee suspected of making bombs. In addition to [REDACTED] there was a [REDACTED] interrogator, a [REDACTED] and a [REDACTED] interrogator. [REDACTED] stated that during the interrogation, there was no touching of the detainee by any of the interrogators, nor was there any rough treatment of the detainee. [REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] did notice that the detainee had bruises under both of his eyes, and that the bruises did not appear to be fresh. [REDACTED] stated they were not the first group to interrogate the detainee, as the detainee knew the procedures of the interrogation. [REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] did not visit the Abu Ghraib prison during [REDACTED] time in Iraq. [REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] did have multiple telephone conversations with the interrogators who worked at the Abu Ghraib prison, and during those conversations there were never any discussions of the activities that were going on at that prison. [REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] heard rumors of the detainees being subjected to sleep deprivation, and the use of dogs to instill fear in the detainees, but has no first hand knowledge of those incidents. [REDACTED] provided no additional information concerning either prison facility.

Reviewed by: [REDACTED]

6/21/04